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Chapter 12 
ANALYSIS OF FORECLOSURE IN THE 
EC GUIDELINES ON VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 
Steven C. Salopt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The antitrust treatment of vertical restraints is quite controversial. In the 
United States, for example, warring vertical restraints guidelines were issued 
by the Department of Justice and National Association of Attorneys General, 
a group of antitrust enforcers from the individual states. 1 However, a 
consensus was never achieved and these guidelines never entered the 
mainstream. Compare them to the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which 
have become a template for evaluation of horizontal restraints.2 
The new EC Guidelines on Vertical Restraints Guidelines ("GVRs") 
represent a significant effort to create and implement a consistent analytic 
framework for evaluating vertical restraints.3 The scope of the project is quite 
significant. The category of vertical restraints represents a broad set of 
practices that raise an array of issues - efficiencies, collusion, foreclosure, 
intrabrand vs. interbrand competition and so on. 
In this short article, I examine the central foreclosure issues in the GVRs. 
I focus mainly on the general enforcement policy, though I do discuss the 
block exemption regulation at the end. I examine the GVRs through the lens 
of economic analysis and the U.S. antitrust laws. I do not touch on resale price 
maintenance, market allocation or franchising. Even aside from space 
limitations in this article, I have chosen to focus on foreclosure because it is the 
t. Professor of Economics and Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington. 
1. Department of Justice (Antitrust Division), Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 50 FR 
6263 (February 14, 1985); Vertical Restraints As Adopted by The National Association of 
Attorneys General, (1985), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 113,400 (1995). 
2. U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines (1992, as amended in 1997, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 113,104. In my 
own antitrust economics and law course, I spend about 20% of the classes on the horizontal 
merger guidelines, using them as a vehicle to teach antitrust economics. I do not even assign 
the vertical restraints guidelines, which for that matter are not included in the casebook that 
I use. 
3. Commission Notice - Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (2000) (hereafter, "GVRs"). 
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more difficult and controversial area. For example, the recent Competitor 
Collaboration Guidelines issued by the U.S. antitrust agencies did not cover 
exclusion at all.4 In contrast, the GVRs examine limited distribution, exclusive 
distribution, single branding and exclusive supply in detail. 
The antitrust evaluation of vertical restraints is comprised of the analysis 
of procompetitive efficiency benefits and anticompetitive harms. The 
efficiency benefits involve coordination of incentives and elimination of 
various types of free riding. As for potential harms from exclusives, two 
theories of foreclosure may be distinguished. Input foreclosure arises when 
a vertical agreement requires an input supplier to sell exclusively or on more 
favorable terms to one buyer, and thus discriminate in some way against 
other potential buyers. Customer foreclosure arises when a contract requires 
the buyer to purchase most or all of its needs of a particular product from a 
single supplier. Depending on the vertical restraint, one or both of these types 
of foreclosure can arise. 
This article is organized as follows. Section II sets out the basic analytic 
framework. Section III examines the procompetitive efficiency benefits. 
Section IV examines input foreclosure and Section V examines customer 
foreclosure. The limited role of competition for exclusives in constraining 
foreclosure also is discussed in this section. Section VI briefly discusses the 
role of exemptions based on market shares. 
II. BASIC ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK 
The GVRs focus on agreements between manufacturers and their 
wholesale and retail distributors. However, the same approach could easily 
be applied to other exclusivity agreements between input suppliers and the 
output producers that purchase their inputs. It also could be applied to 
exclusive contracts between sellers and final consumers. 
In evaluating exclusivity and foreclosure concerns, it is important to 
distinguish which party is restrained by the exclusive. Consider an 
"exclusive" agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor. An 
"exclusivity" term in their contract could require that the manufacturer sell 
only to the distributor. Alternatively, it could require that the distributor 
purchase only from the manufacturer. Of course, the contract could specify 
both types of exclusivity. The GVRs are concerned with both types of 
exclusives. "Single branding" involves a distributor buying most or all of its 
requirements from a single manufacturer. ~106. "Limited distribution" 
involves a manufacturer selling only to one distributor (or one distributor in 
a particular area or for resale to a particular group of customers). ~109 
These different types of exclusives raise somewhat different analytic 
issues. In my own work, I distinguish between two types of foreclosure 
4. US. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Conunission, Antitrust Guidelines for 
Collaborations Among Competitors (2000). I have drafted a preliminary set of companion 
provisions to cover exclusionary conduct. S. Salop, Sample Guidelines On Exclusionary 
Access Agreements By Competitor Collaborations (November 1999) (available from author). 
EC GUIDELINES ON VERTICAL RESTRAIN1S 179 
concerns, which I denote as "input" and "customer" foreclosure. 5 Input 
foreclosure involves a situation in which an input supplier refuses to sell or 
discriminates against certain buyers. ll1ose buyers are foreclosed from the 
input In the manufacturer/ distributor context, this corresponds to what the 
GVRs call "limited distribution." Customer foreclosure involves a situation in 
which a customer refuses to buy or limits its purchases from certain sellers. 
Those sellers are foreclosed from selling to the buyer. In the 
manufacturer/ distributor context, this corresponds directly to what the GVRs 
call "single branding. "6 
In a market economy, competitors are expected to compete. As a result, 
cooperation among competitors is considered exceptional. Cooperation 
among competitors can lead to reduced costs and improved products. 
However, the risk of price fixing and customer allocation makes such 
"horizontal" agreements inherently suspicious to antitrust enforcers and 
regulators. Cooperation between sellers and buyers is the opposite. Goods 
and services ca1mot be produced unless buyers and sellers cooperate in some 
way, at least by transferring inputs from sellers to buyers, who then convert 
those inputs into outputs that can be sold to consumers. As a result, "vertical" 
agreements between suppliers and buyers are not inherently suspicious. 
Antitrust analysis of vertical restraints involves the economic evaluation 
and balancing of potential procompetitive benefits against potential 
anticompetitive harms, in order to gauge the net competitive impact of the 
restraints on consumer welfare and aggregate economic welfare. The GVRs 
use the terminology "negative effects" for anticompetitive harms and "positive 
effects" for procompetitive efficiency benefits. 
In antitrust, this type of full competitive analysis sometimes is truncated 
with permissive exemptions and safe harbors. In other situations, it is 
truncated by summarily condemning the conduct with per se rules of 
illegality. However, even in these situations, an ex ante balancing of benefits 
and harms of the class of restraint provides the analytic foundation for these 
rebuttable (or irrebuttable) legal presumptions. 7 In this regard, the GVRs 
provide exemptions under the Block Exemption Regulation ("BER") and 
Article 81(3). ll1e GVRs do not apply any rules of per se illegality in the 
analysis of foreclosure theories. I discuss the BER market share rules briefly 
at the end of the article. 
Antitrust and competition analysis involves two competing economic 
welfare standards. A "consumer welfare" standard evaluates restraints in 
5. M. Riordan and S. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 
63 Antitrust L.J. 513 (1995). 
6. As discussed below, the analysis of input foreclosure also applies to a situation 
where a distributor agrees only to serve a single manufacturer. This is because distribution 
services can be viewed as an input that the manufacturer purchases from distributors. Thus, 
"single branding" can be evaluated as input foreclosure too. 
7. For a recent review of this "decision theoretic" approach to summary disposition, 
see F. Beckner andS. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 Antitrust L. J. 41 (1999) 
and the references cited therein. 
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terms of their effects on consumers. Under this standard, cost savings and 
other efficiency benefits created by the restraints are cognizable only if they 
are shared with consumers by being passed along to consumers in the form 
of lower prices or superior products. If restraints injure competitors, that 
competitor injury does not count for its own sake. In some cases, that 
competitor injury may lead to consumer harm, which then does count. 
However, consumer harm is not inevitable and may not be presumed merely 
from the fact that competitors are injured. After all, producing a better 
product also harms competitors even as it benefits consumers. 
A competing antitrust standard is the "aggregate welfare" standard. (It 
sometimes is referred to as an "efficiency" standard.) This standard grades 
restraints on the basis of their aggregate impact on all participants -
consumers, the parties adopting the restraint and their competitors. The 
aggregate welfare standard is indifferent to transfers of wealth among these 
parties. The efficiency benefits need not be passed through to consumers in 
order to count. 
The issue of injury to competitors creates significant confusion. For 
example, Robert Bork stressed that efficiencies should count in antitrust; he 
was a driving force in the U.S. courts' recognizing the importance of efficiency 
benefits. 8 Bork also argued that courts should view injury to competitors as 
insufficient to condemn restraints. He argued that competitors complain 
about conduct that increases efficiency and benefits consumers and 
competition. Despite this recognition, however, Bork failed to embrace the 
consumer welfare standard. Although he states that the goal of antitrust is 
the maximization of consumer welfare, he adopted the aggregate welfare 
standard instead. This standard does not require the pass-through of 
efficiency benefits to consumers. It also would treat competitor injury as part 
of the balance, irrespective of its effect on consumers. Bork never comments 
on this confusing inconsistency. 
The GVRs do not present a perfectly clear picture of their underlying 
welfare standard. In some places, they seem to have in mind a consumer 
welfare standard in which efficiency benefits must be shared with consumers 
in order to count For example, in discussing the relevant factors under Article 
81(3), the GVRs state that permissible vertical restraints must have efficiency 
benefits. In addition, the GVRs state that "the vertical agreement must allow 
consumers a fair share of these benefits." Indeed, ~134 goes on to say that the 
vertical restraints must be "indispensable" to attain the benefits. This 
approach then is developed in more detail in ~136. 9 
The next three sections evaluate in turn the procompetitive and 
anticompetitive effects of exclusives involved in vertical restraints. 
8. R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (1979) 
9. However, the GVRs are not always clear about whether they require proof of likely 
harm to consumers to condenm a restraint or whether harm to competitors by itself is 
sufficient, as discussed in more detail later on. 
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III. PROCOMPETITIVE BENEFITS OF EXCLUSIVE CONTRACTS 
Exclusive contracts can be procompetitive. ll1ey can facilitate a type of 
vertical integration "by contract" and other sources of consumer benefits. 
Integration can create efficiency benefits by improving product design and 
product quality. Other efficiency benefits may arise from eliminating free 
riding or coordinating incentives in other ways. Consumers also benefit from 
lower prices or superior products that coordination may bring. Where such 
efficiency benefits occur, they can reduce the potential harm from exclusivity 
or might even lead to a net consumer welfare benefit instead of a net 
consumer harm. ll1us, the analysis of efficiency benefits is included in the 
economic analysis of impact on consumers. 
Exclusive contracts can improve coordination between the parties to the 
exclusives. In particular, exclusives can eliminate free riding and induce 
greater focus on activities that serve the joint interests of the parties to the 
agreement. In this way, competition can be increased and consumers can 
gain. llms, if efficiency claims are real and not simply a pretext for adopting 
anticompetitive exclusives, they imply the need to balance harms against 
benefits according to the appropriate welfare standard. 
The GVRs examine the procompetitive benefits of exclusive contracts in 
§1.2. A number of specific efficiency justifications are set out in ~116. The 
general issue of acting in the mutual interest of the parties is not discussed 
explicilly.10 1l1is paragraph does examine the role of exclusive distribution in 
resolving free rider problems. Consistent with the GVRs' focus on the 
relationship among manufacturers and distributors, the discussion is focused 
on promotional free riding, certification and similar manufacturer/ dealer 
issues. The paragraph also raises the potential that exclusives would be 
necessary to open up new markets, achieve economies of scale, avoid holdups 
and so on. 
1l1e GVRs express a concern about the potential scope of these efficiency 
justifications and imply some skepticism towards broad efficiency claims. 
This is made even clearer in ~ ~134-36 in setting out the conditions for 
applying the exemption under Article 81(3). In these paragraphs, the GVRs 
set a very high standard on vertical restraints alleged to create efficiency 
benefits. First, the restraints must be "substantiated." ll1ey cannot involve 
just "general statements on cost savings." Second, the efficiency benefits must 
dominate any anticompetitive concerns so that they lead to an increase in 
consumer welfare. ll1ird, the restraints must be "indispensable to the 
attainment of these benefits." Fourth, the GVRs suggest the possibility that 
the restraints must be the "least anticompetitive" alternative. 
These conditions are similar in some ways to U.S. antitrust law and differ 
in other ways. ll1e first two conditions are discussed in the evaluation of 
10. In 1101 the GVRs recognize that incentives can change when the upstream and 
downstream finnsshare profits. In that paragraph, they focus on potential anticompetitive 
ham1S, not procompelitive benefits. However, the same sharing of profits also incentivizes 
the firms lo lake greater procompetitive actions that increase joint profits. 
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"cogniz.ability" of efficiency benefits in the U.S. merger guidelines. The third 
condition, the GVRs' "indispensability" standard, seems to set a higher 
standard than the "reasonably necessary" standard commonly used in U.S. 
antitrust law and recent guidelines. 11 As for the fourth condition, a "least anti-
competitive" alternative standard sometimes is viewed as implicit in the 
"reasonably necessary" test in U.S. law and sometimes is viewed as a more 
stringent standard. The more stringent test remains controversial. 
IV. INPUT FORECLOSURE 
One type of competitive concern can be characterized as input foreclosure. 12 
This involves the potential anticompetitive effects raised when a firm becomes 
the exclusive customer of its input suppliers or when those suppliers provide 
their inputs on more favorable terms to the firm. Such agreements may 
disadvantage the firm's rivals in the output market by cutting off their supply 
or raising their cost of critical inputs. Not only may such an input market 
disadvantage injure rivals, it also may harm the customers of the output 
market competitors by giving the excluding firm the power to raise or 
maintain its prices above the competitive level. That is, the exclusive 
agreements may give the firm what might be termed exclusio1Lary market 
power. 
These inputs may be unbranded inputs in the production of a commodity, 
such as electricity for smelting aluminum. The inputs can be components 
used to create a finished product or system, such as tires for an automobile or 
an operating system for a computer. A retail distributor views the brands that 
it resells as inputs. At the same lime, as illustrated in Example 3 below, a 
manufacturer may view retail distribution as an input into the sale of its 
product. (This issue is also discussed in the customer foreclosure section.) 
A. Two-Step Aualysis of Co11s11111er Harm 
ll1e potential anticompetitive harm from this type of exclusivity strategy 
can be determined by a two-step analysis of the structure and conduct in 
input and output markets. The first "raising rivals' costs" step examines 
whether rivals' input costs are raised or their efficiency is degraded. The 
11. This point is made explicit in the Competitor Collaboration Guidelines. As they 
state in section 3.2,"an aereement may be 'reasonably necessary' without being essential. 
However, if the participants could achieve an equivalent or comparable efficiency-enhancing 
integration through practical, si&lificantly less restrictive means, then the Agencies conclude 
that the agreement is not reasonably necessary ." (emphasis added) 
12. The analysis of exclusion in this section and the next relies on a number of my own 
articles and the references to others' articles cited there. For example, see T. Krattenmaker 
andS. Salop, Antico1{1petitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals Costs To Achieve Power Over Price, 
96 Yale L.J. 209 (1986); M. Riordan and S. Salop, supra note 6; S. Salop and R. C. Romaine, 
Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards and Microsoft, 7 George Mason 
LR. 617 (1999). 
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second "power over price" step examines whether prices paid by consumers 
in the output market are increased, relative to the appropriate competitive 
benchmark. 
1. Raising Rivals' Costs 
The first step evaluates the impact on input prices and rivals' costs. This 
step involves potential injury to competitors. The inquiry here focuses on the 
issue whether competitors' costs of the foreclosed input will likely increase as 
a result of the exclusives. In particular, it evaluates the number and quality 
of alternative suppliers along with the prices they likely will charge. As a 
general matter, if rivals can substitute to equally cost-effective alternative 
inputs and the effectiveness of input market competition is not reduced, then 
there would be no competitor harm. Of course, if competitors are not 
disadvantaged, then there can be no significant consumer harm either. 
The existence of input suppliers who are not tied up by the exclusive 
arrangements means that rivals have options and are not totally foreclosed. 
However, other input suppliers may not be sufficient to prevent rivals' costs 
from being raised. First, the ability of remaining input suppliers to expand 
may be constrained by capacity limits. Second, their costs and prices may be 
higher than the suppliers who are parties to the exclusives. Third, if there are 
only a small number of unrestrained suppliers, they may have the incentive 
to raise their prices in response to the exclusives. This is because they no 
longer face competition from the input suppliers who now have been tied up 
by the exclusives and can no longer sell to certain potential customers. In this 
sense, the exclusives may facilitate tacit or express collusion among the 
unrestrained suppliers still available to the rivals. This last condition 
sometimes is overlooked in vertical restraint analysis. Doing so creates a 
significant potential for error. 
2. Power Over Price 
The second step evaluates the impact on output prices flowing from any 
cost increase borne by the rivals. This step involves potential injury to 
consumers. The inquiry here focuses on the issue of whether output market 
prices will likely increase or whether rivals in the relevant output market, both 
the excluded firms and other firms that produce close substitutes, instead will 
maintain the ability and incentive to compete effectively. Because there may 
be close substitutes for the product of the firm that achieves the exclusives and 
its competitors, injury to these competitors docs not necessarily imply injury 
to consumers. Instead, competition among non-excluded firms may remain 
intense and there may be competition with other firms that have their own 
exclusives. This last point means that multiple exclusives actually may cause 
less of an anticompetitive effect, a type of "reverse" cumulative effect, as 
discussed in Example 2 below. Competition with substitute products also 
may prevent prices from rising. 
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If rivals' costs are raised, the firm that obtains the exclusive may be able to 
gain market power to raise prices in the downstream (output) market. This 
power over price may involve either unilateral action or tacit coordination 
with downstream competitors. l11e parties to the coordinated conduct may 
include those competitors disadvantaged by the higher input costs or other 
exclusionary conduct In a sense, these partially excluded rivals could be said 
to be involuntarily induced to cooperate, as a result of their higher costs. In 
this way the integrated firm achieves market power, that is, the power to price 
above the competitive level in the output market. As discussed below, this 
power may involve raising price above the pre-exclusion level or maintaining 
a high price in the face of competition that otherwise would have forced price 
down. 
Where both these steps are proved, the exclusionary conduct harms 
consumers and reduces economic efficiency, absent offsetting procompetitive 
efficiency benefits. Consumers are harmed by the higher downstream prices. 
Efficiency can be reduced in two ways by this conduct. First, a consumer 
deadweight loss results if and when consumers reduce their purchase levels. 
Second, the higher costs borne by rivals may lead those firms to utilize an 
inefficient input mix or may lead relatively more efficient firms to reduce their 
market shares. 
This raises a distinction between this achievement and exercise of 
excl11sio11ary market power and classical market power. 13 l11e classical market 
power of a monopolist permits it profitably lo raise and maintain price above 
the competitive level by restricting its ow11 output. Excl11sio11ary market power 
is the power profitably to raise or maintain price above the competitive level 
by conduct that raises the cosl'i or otherwise disadvantages competitors in the 
output market. Excl11sio11ary market power does not require the excluding 
firm also to have classicnl market power. If rivals' costs are increased by being 
foreclosed from an input, they will restrict their output and raise price, 
permitting the excluding firm to increase its output price too. In addition, the 
exercise of exclusionary market power sometimes involves preventing entry 
or raising the cost of entry of competitors that otherwise would drive output 
prices down. 
l11e analysis of the exclusives and the relevant market must be sensitive 
to the type of anticompetitive allegation. 14 In particular, where the allegation 
is that the exclusives will prevent prices from falling, then competition from 
other firms or other products that would constrain prices from rising above 
the current, pre-exclusive price level would not prevent the alleged 
anticompetitive effect. l11e fact that prices caru1ot rise does not mean that they 
cannot be prevented from falling. Analysis that is not sensitive to this issue 
is prone to error. This issue is illustrated in Example 4. 
13. See T. Krallenmaker, R. Lande and S. Sa lop, Monopoly Power and Market Power 
in Antitrust Law, 76 Geo. Univ. L. Rev. 241 (1987). 
14. S. Salop, The First Principles Approach lo Antitrust, Kodak, and Antitrust at the 
Millennium, 68 Antitrust L. J. 187 (2000). 
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B. Illustrative Examples 
This section sets out some examples to illustrate the analysis of input 
foreclosure. 
1. Example 1: two-step approacl1 
There are 4 major producers of portrait cameras used by professional 
portrait photographers. A new "flash" technology has been developed that 
uses halogen bulbs and computerized timing. There are three developers in 
this area, each of which has its own patented technology. The leading camera 
producer, which has a 40% market share, has made exclusive agreements with 
two of these three halogen flash technology companies. 
Analysis: These exclusives can reduce the quality of rivals' camera 
offerings or raise their costs. There is one developer left. However, that 
developer's technology may be inappropriate for some of the camera 
competitors or more expensive. In addilion, realizing that it no longer faces 
any competition in selling to the three camera companies, this one remaining 
developer may exploit its quasi-monopoly position by raising its price. If the 
camera competitors' costs are raised or their quality reduced, the leading 
camera company may gain the ability to raise or maintain its camera price. As 
a result, camera purchasers may be harmed. 
A change in facts can alter the conclusions. If there were six competing 
flash technologies instead of three, then the likelihood that exclusives with 
two of them would disadvantage rivals would be reduced. Four choices 
would remain, despite the exclusives. In the downstream market, if portrait 
cameras are not distinct but face intense competition from other 35mm 
cameras, then the leading firm may be unable to raise its price, even if it 
successfully can disadvantage other portrait camera rivals. 
2. Example 2: Multiple buyers witlt exclusives 
Videoworld is the largest video movie rental chain in several member 
states, followed closely by California Video and Videomax. These three retail 
chains account for 70% of all video rentals, with the rest accounted for by 
small stores and mail order sales. Videoworld recently made an agreement 
with the distribution arm of one of the five major movie distributors for an 
exclusive that permits Videoworld to obtain a two-month exclusive on its 
choice of 20% of the new movies offered by this distributor each year. 
California Video and Videomax followed this by striking their own similar 
exclusivity deals with two of the other distributors. 
Analysis: This series of agreements cuts off the smaller video rental stores' 
access to 20% of the new videos offered by three of the five distributors. This 
can place them at a disadvantage by cutting off their early access to the 
newest hit videos. At the same time, they can continue to compete on 
remaining non-exclusive videos and are unencumbered by the exclusives after 
two months, as well as all the new videos offered by the other distributors. 
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Whether or not these retail competitors are significantly disadvantaged in the 
market involves the degree of substitutability among these classes of videos 
and competition among the distributors. This analysis includes, of course, the 
same type of substitution analysis that would be used for determining 
whether the sale of new, hit videos constitutes a separate relevant market, 
though the focus is somewhat altered. 
A second issue involves the fact that multiple video rental chains have 
exclusives. The GVRs (at ~133) raise the issue of the "cumulative" effect from 
multiple exclusives. ll1e "cumulative" exclusivity here increases the likelihood 
of an adverse impact on rivals that do not have such exclusivity agreements, 
as well as potential entrants. However, it does not inevitably increase the 
likelihood of an adverse anticompetitive effect on consumers. Competition 
among the three chains with the exclusives will continue. In fact, it may 
intensify if the exclusives have significant procompelilive benefits, say by 
eliminating free riding.15 If the exclusives create efficiency benefits that reduce 
costs, then the competition can lead to even lower prices as then more efficient 
firms compete more effectively. 1hus, merely assuming that such multiple 
exclusives magnify the competitive concerns may lead to error. 
3. Example 3: Distribution services as i11puts 
The sale of "consumable" office products by office "superstores" has been 
a growing phenomenon. ll1ese stores have lower costs that tend to translate 
into lower retail prices. ll1ere are three office superstore chains in Europe: 
L'Office Max, Euroclips and Bern.hards. These three chains compete with each 
other and also with the numerous stationary stores and other retail outlets 
that distribute consumable office products. The leading producer of 
transparent tape recently has made agreements with each of the three 
superstores to carry its tape exclusively, in exchange for a substantial lump 
sum annual payment to the stores. 
Analysis: Although products flow from the manufacturer to the retailer 
and then to the customer, the supply of retail distribution services can be 
viewed analytically as inputs into the sale of products by manufacturers. 
Examined in th.is way, these exclusives may raise the distribution costs of the 
competing tape manufacturers by foreclosing them from the lowest cost 
distribution channel. llms, even if these Lape companies remain viable, their 
15. In particular, the rationale for the exclusives needs to be investigated. It is possible 
that the purpose and effect of the exclusives are to increase promotion of the videos and 
reduce free riding. For example, as part of the exclusivity agreements, perhaps the chains 
promised to stock more copies of the videos in order to avoid an out-of-stock situation. In 
addition, perhaps the chains promised to significantly increase their promotion of the 
exclusive videos. Even without the exclusives, their incentives to promote would reasonably 
be expected to increase from the exclusives because other chains would not share in the 
additional rentals generated by the advertisements. Coupled with the fact that the three 
exclusives tie up only 20% of the new videos for only three of the five distributors, the 
impact on competition may be procompetilive on balance. 
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high distribution costs may give the leading tape company the power to raise 
or maintain a non-competitive price. 
In the statement of the example, it was stated that the exclusives were 
secured by lump sum payments to the distributors. Economic theory predicts 
that lump sum payments are not passed on to consumers in the form of lower 
prices. However, if the exclusives instead were secured by providing the 
distributors with discounted wholesale prices or payments tied directly to 
sales levels, the results are different. In this case, the retailers would have 
lower variable costs and, thus, a greater incentive to pass through at least a 
portion of the discount to consumers in the form of a lower retail price. 
Similarly, suppose that the agreements require the retailers to reduce their 
retail prices. Such "variable" payments would reduce the potential harm from 
exclusives and make it more likely that they would benefit consumers. 16 
4. Exnmple 4: Avoiding price competition 
Trialsoft is the leading provider of litigation support database software, 
with over 50% of the market. Law firm offices purchase litigation support 
software. It requires extensive training and customer support over time as the 
product improves. The companies rely on independent consultants to provide 
the training, particularly the consulling arms of the large accounting firms. 
A new database entrant, NeuralSearch, has created an innovative database 
program that uses neural network techniques that dramatically improve the 
efficiency of searches and permit linkages to be taken to higher 
dimensionality. Trialsoft has only just begun to work on upgrading its 
product using neural network techniques and is still 1-2 years away from 
having a product as good as the current release of NeuralSearch's product. 
NeuralSearch is in the process of soliciting consulting firms to sell and support 
its software. To counter the entry of NeuralSearch, Trialsoft has begun to 
require its distributors to sell only its database program. The consulting firms 
would prefer to sell both programs because most clients do not need the 
complexity of the NeuralSearch product and Trialsoft's other competitors 
mostly appeal to specialized customer niches. 
Analysis: The possible competitive concern here is that the Trialsoft 
exclusives will delay or deter the entry of NeuralSearch, if NeuralSearch 
cannot find sufficient alternative dealers. Absent substitute dealers, 
consumers may be denied access to the superior NeuralSearch product as well 
as to the price and innovation competition that it may induce in Trialsoft. It 
is true that Trialsoft faces competition from firms other than NeuralSearch and 
this competition does constrain Trialsoft's prices to some extent. However, 
because it has a sui-,erior product, NeuralSearch may be able to create a degree 
of competition that those products cannot. As a result, NeuralSearch's entry 
16. In carrying out the analysis of this issue, it is important to ensure that the discounts 
were not based on or accompanied by wholesale price increases and that net wholesale 
prices actually were reduced. 
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may force Trialsoft to reduce its prices and innovate faster. The timing of 
Trialsoft's new exclusivity policy also is suspicious. 
Competition for exclusives is unlikely to deter Trialsoft market power in 
this situation. NeuralSearch is not well positioned to obtain an exclusive 
because its product appeals only to a limited group of clients. Even if 
NeuralSearch and the others would band together, it is still not clear that the 
consulting firms would view them as a good alternative to Trialsoft in an all-
or-nothing competition for exclusives. In addition, it would be difficult for 
NeuralSearch and the other niche competitors to coordinate a response to 
Trialsoft. That coalition likely would face free rider problems and other 
transactions costs. 
C. Applicatio11 to the GVRs 
The GVRs' analysis of "limited distribution" (at ,,109-10) and "exclusive 
distribution" at ilil161-77) is generally consistent with the basic theory of input 
foreclosure, where the inputs are the brands resold by the distributor. Thus, 
when a manufacturer limits its number of resellers or has an exclusive 
distribution system in which it sells to only a single reseller in an area, it 
forecloses the other dealers from access to the "input" it produces. As stated 
in ,103, this can raise barriers to entry. It can also facilitate collusion at the 
buyers' level in the output market, as discussed in ,167. 
As explained in ,24, the GVRs cover all types of vertical agreements. 
However, the GVRs focus mainly on manufacturer/ distributor relations, not 
the broader type of exclusives or favoritism that might arise with respect to 
other inputs used in the production and sale of goods and services. In fact, in 
,96(i) the GVRs suggest that vertical restraints for intermediate goods 
generally are less worrisome. Similarly, in ,119 (5) the GVRs conclude that 
vertical restraints for "non-branded" goods and services generally raise fewer 
competition concerns because differentiation reduces the degree of 
substitution. Inputs such as electricity used in aluminum production would 
seem to fit within this category of non-branded goods. 
However, this approach may be too permissive. Even if inputs are not 
differentiated, significant competitive concerns nonetheless can be raised 
when the input producers' costs differ or where there is limited capacity. 
Concerns also can arise when the input market is sufficiently concentrated 
that elimination of the restrained supplier from the exclusive gives the 
remaining suppliers the ability and incentive to coordinate to raise their prices. 
Paragraph 119(5) also suggests that there are fewer concerns about 
intermediate goods (i.e., inputs) because buyers lend to be more sophisticated. 
Sophisticated buyers who account for a large share of a seller's sales clearly 
can help to deter price increases. However, that point does not seem to be the 
focus here. Moreover, these conditions do not inevitably occur for 
intermediate goods. 
Another issue i~1volves the distinction between injury to competitors and 
injury to competition. The theory of input foreclosure set out above requires 
a showing of likely injury to the consumers who purchase in the output 
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market. This injury could arise either from unilateral market power by the 
distributor who has the exclusive or from coordination between that 
distributor and others. Such proof of likely consumer injury generally is 
required under U.S. antitrust law when manufacturers unilaterally adopt 
vertical restraints. 17 
It is not entirely certain under what circumstances the GVRs require proof 
of injury to competition versus the circumstances in which evidence of injury 
to the excluded competitors is sufficient. On the one hand, ~96(i) clearly 
seems concerned wilh downstream effects and seems to suggest the type of 
two-step analysis set out above. As staled in this paragraph: 
a vertical aereement may not only have effects on lhe market 
between supplier and buyer but may also have effects on 
downstream markets. For an individual assessment of a vertical 
agreement, the relevant markets at each level of trade affected by 
the restraints contained in the agreement will be examined. 
In a similar vein, ~103 discusses barriers to entry and 1119(1) discusses 
market power (presumably downstream) and loss of interbrand competition. 
Similarly, ~119 (5) talks about injury to "competition." In addition, the second 
harm mentioned in 1110 involves the potential for the restraints to facilitate 
tacit or express collusion in the output or input market. Collusion in the 
output market (where the distributors operate) would typically lead to 
consumer injury, so th.is would be consistent with proof of power over price. 18 
On the other hand, iJllO does not make it perfectly clear whether likely 
harm to final consumers is required. As stated in 1110, one of the three 
possible negative effects on competition is that "certain buyers within that 
market can no longer buy from that particular supplier, and this may lead in 
particular in the case of exclusive supply, to foreclosure of the purchase 
market." 1l1e issue becomes whether "foreclosure of the purchase market" 
means injury to consumers or whether it simply means injury to the 
competitors who are denied access to the product. 1l1at is, in terms of the 
17. The situation is different when adoption of the vertical restraints involves a 
horizontal agreement. For a recent case, see Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 
2000 U.S. App. Lexis 18304. For analysis of input foreclosure applied to vertical restraints 
adopted by a group of competitors, see D. Carlton & S. Salop, You Keep on Knocking but 
You Can't Come in: Evaluating Restrictions on Access to Input Joint Ventures, 9 HARV. J. L. 
& TECH. 319 (1996). For a provocative analysis of the use of truncated rules applied to 
vertical restraints, see A. D. Melamed, Exclusionary Vertical Agreements, Speech Before the 
ABA Antitrust Section (Apr. 2, 1998), available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/ 
1623.htm. For the application of truncated rules to monopolists' conduct, see J. Baker, 
Promoting limovation Competition Through the Aspen/Kodak Rule, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev., 
495 (1999). 
18. Express collusion in the input market would be illegal under U.S. law, irrespective 
of its impact on downstream markets. If it involves only tacit coordination that is facilitated 
by the fact that the exclusive eliminates a competitor, then impact in the downstream market 
probably also would be required. 
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tem1inology used above, is it enough to prove that the exclusives likely lead 
to "raising rivals' costs," or must the government also prove that the 
downstream firm likely gains "power over price?" 
Another possible difference between the statement of input foreclosure 
here and the GVRs involves the treatment of multiple exclusives and 
cumulative foreclosure. For example, the concern about collusion in i(llO is 
focused on the situation in which "most or all of the competing suppliers" limit 
the number of retailers. However, multiple exclusives are not necessary to 
cause a potential coordination problem under the input foreclosure theory. 
For example, if exclusives raise the cost of one or more downstream rivals of 
the firm that adopts the exclusive, those higher costs could facilitate pricing 
coordination among the downstream firms. Indeed, Jonathan Baker has 
described the impact of such cost-raising strategies as pushing the foreclosed 
rivals into an "involuntary cartel" in the downstream market. 19 Exclusives can 
facilitate express or tacit collusion among the input suppliers because the 
exclusive eliminates the competition from the restrained supplier. 
At the same lime, as discussed in Example 2, the fact that multiple 
suppliers have exclusives does not necessarily cause a reinforcing, cumulative 
effect that facilitates collusion. It is also possible that continued competition 
amone the distributors that have exclusives can prevent prices from rising. In 
fact, if the exclusives create efficiency benefits that reduce costs, then 
competition may be intensified and even lead to lower prices under some 
conditions. 
As discussed above, exclusives can lead to prices above the competitive 
level. These price effects sometimes involve a firm that already has some 
market power being able to "enhance" its market power by using exclusives 
to raise price further above the competitive level. As written in i(119(1), the 
GVRs appear to focus only on this case of "enhancing" market power. 
However, this is not the only potential competitive harm. Vertical restraints 
also may permit a firm that initially lacks market power in the world without 
exclusives lo "achieve" market power as a result of the exclusivity. Or, they 
can allow a firm with market power to "maintain" its market power by raising 
the costs of new entrants or fringe firms that otherwise would cause price 
decreases in the absence of the exclusives. 
The GVRs' focus on firms that already have classical market power also 
raises another potential limitation on the constraints they place on the firms' 
conduct. The GVRs state in i(120 (1) that the first step in the competitive 
evaluation is the determination of the relevant market. To avoid errors, 
relevant markets should not be defined in a vacuum but rather in the context 
of the anticompetitive allegations.2° For example, in the U.S. duPont 
monopolization case, the Supreme Court committed what is now known as 
19. Jonathan Baker, Vertical Restraints with Horizontal Consequences: Competitive 
Effects of "Most-Favored-Customer" Clauses, 64 Antitrust L. J. 517,523 (1996). 
20. S. Salop, First Principles, supra note 15. 
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the Cellopl1m1e Trnp. 21 Because duPont was charging the monopoly price for 
cellophane wrapping, it could not profitably raise ils price any more. Indeed, 
this is the very definition of the monopoly price. Rather than recognizing that 
duP011t's monopoly was the cause of the unprofitability of additional price 
increases, the Supreme Court erroneously concluded that duPont lacked 
market power in a broader flexible wrapping market. By defining the relevant 
market first, and in the absence of any detailed evaluation of the potential 
harms of vertical restraints, the GVRs sometimes may commit the classic 
Cellophane Trnp or a related error. ll1is obviously also could be a major 
problem in certain cases in which the block exemption regulation is applied, 
as discussed in more detail in Section VI. 
V. CUSTOMER FORECLOSURE 
Customer foreclosure refers to using exclusive contracts and other 
strategies that exclude rivals from access to a sufficient customer base. If the 
use of exclusives can reduce the sales of a competitor sufficiently, that 
competitor may be driven below minimum viable scale (i.e., break-even sales 
level) and forced to exit from the market. 22 Even if it does not exit, it may 
suffer higher marginal costs that limit its ability to compete effectively. It may 
also face reduced incentives to engage in non-price competition. As a result, 
the exclusives may harm competition by giving the excluding firm the power 
to raise its price or maintain a price above the competitive level. Alternatively, 
the exclusives may harm competition by leading to higher prices in a related 
output market. 
Of course, where the competitive instrument of customer foreclosure is 
solely offering low prices to consumers, consumer injury clearly is less likely 
and antitrust law is rightfully skeptical. Whatever long-Lenn consumer harms 
may occur from any resulting foreclosure must be balanced against the 
immediate consumer benefits from the lower prices. For this reason, antitrust 
standards for proving predatory pricing have tightened considerably over the 
past two decades. 23 
Tilis analysis also raises the question of how the firm is able to induce its 
customers (either distributors or final consumers) to accept the exclusives. 
One obvious way is for the excluding firm to "purchase" the exclusive, either 
21. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S 377 (1956). For the classic 
statement of the Supreme Court's error, see Donald Turner, Antitrust Policy and the 
Cellophane Case, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 281 (1956). 
22. E. Rasmusen, D. Ramseyer and J. Wiley, Naked Exclusion, 81 American Economic 
Review 1137 (1991); M. Whinston and I. Segal, Naked Exclusion: Comment, 90 American 
Economic Review 2% (2000). For a further non-technical discussion, see Riordan and Salop, 
supra note 6. 
23. See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 
(1993). For a recent economic analysis of this case and discussion of new theories of 
predicting pricing, see Brolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 
88 Geo. LR. 2239 (2000). 
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in the form of a cash payment or a quid pro quo for some reciprocal favor. 
Such "carrots" can induce customers to go along. The cost of these 
exclusionary rights is unlikely to prevent the arrangement because the 
exclusionary rights allow the firm to achieve or maintain market power over 
many other customers. Of course, the smaller victims of the exclusives can try 
to induce the distributors to continue to stock their products. However, 
competition for exclusives does not take place on a level playing field. In 
addition, the prospects of these supracompetitive profits should be sufficient 
to allow the larger firm to compensate the exclusive customers for reducing 
their choice. As discussed below, competition is a "public good" and each 
individual customer and supplier has a natural inclination to act as a free 
rider. 
A. Illustrative Examples 
1. Example 5: Bnsic mwlytics 
An exciting new innovation in photofinishing involves a self-service film-
developing machine. TI1e consumer places the film cartridge in the machine 
and the prints or diskettes with digitized images are produced fifteen minutes 
later. TI1e machines also can produce prints from diskettes. The two firms 
producing these machines, Cadko and Eurofilm, have competing technologies 
and their machines have somewhat different features, advantages and 
disadvantages. Cadko was the first entrant and followed a strategy of 
exclusive contracting with the largest grocery and drug store chains in 
exchange for large lump sum payments. When Eurofilm came on the scene, 
it found that Cadko already had exclusives with a significant number of the 
large chains. Cadko also has told potential customers that Eurofilm will fail 
and they will be stuck with its expensive machine. This has led other chains 
to reject Eurofilm's product because of a fear that Cadko's headstart would 
cause Eurofilm to fail. 
Analysis: TI1is use of exclusives prevents the chains from giving final 
consumers a choice by placing both machines in their stores. They also might 
cause Eurofilm's entry to fail. TI1e lump sum payments for the exclusives 
likely are not passed through to consumers and Cadko does not require the 
chains to charee lower prices, so there are no direct consumer price benefits 
from the exclusives. The exclusives also could eliminate longer run price and 
innovation competition by preventing Eurofilm from reaching minimum 
viable scale and instead causing it to exit from the market. Thus, the 
exclusives may cause consumer harm. In contrast, if Eurofilm can sign up a 
sufficient number of exclusive retailers itself, then it would not be driven out 
of business. Potential efficiency rationales also would be relevant to 
competitive evaluations. 
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2. Example 6: Relationship to input foreclosure 
Recalling Example 2, office product office "superstores" have lower costs. 
There are three office superstore chains in Europe: L'Office Max, Euroclips and 
Bernhards. ll1ese three chains compete with each other and also with the 
numerous stationery stores and other retail outlets that distribute consumable 
office products. ll1e leading producer of transparent tape recently has made 
agreements with each of the three superstores to carry its tape exclusively, in 
exchange for a substantial lump sum annual payment. 
Analysis: TI1is problem was previously analyzed as input foreclosure. It 
was seen there that the exclusives could raise the distribution costs of the tape 
competitors. ll1is problem also can be seen as customer foreclosure. If the 
tape competitors are unable to arrange efficient alternative distribution 
charu1els, their sales may be driven below minimum viable scale, forcing them 
to exit. Alternatively, their lower customer base may reduce their incentives 
to advertise, f urlher entrenching the dominant firm. Their incentives to 
innovate also may be compromised, allowing the dominant producer to 
maintain its market power in the future. 
3. Example 7: Impact i11 related output market 
Referring back lo Example 5, Cadko is the largest film producer in the 
world. Cadko's self-service photofinishing machines work best with its own 
film. Competing film comes out somewhat grainy. This "problem" was not 
corrected by a recent software upgrade that did improve the quality for Cadko 
film. Tilis "problem" does not arise with the Eurofilm machines. As the self-
service machines have become established, Cadko's market share in the sale 
of film has risen significantly. In addition, there are rumors in the financial 
press that Cadko's largest film competitor has canceled some research and 
development projects because of cash flow shortfalls. 
Analysis: ll1is example illustrates how an exclusive in one market (e.g., 
photofinishing) can have effects in related markets (e.g., film). Even if there 
is no competitive harm in the photofulishing market, the exclusives could lead 
to anticompetitive effects in the film market. ll1e impact on related markets 
is necessary for a full competitive valuation. 
4. Example 8: Exclusives wit/, final customers 
A daily newspaper in a small town faced no competition for readers or 
advertisers until a new free weekly newspaper recently entered the market. 
Advertisers view the weekly as a partial substitute for the daily newspaper 
and have begun lo shift some of their advertising to the weekly. In response 
to this entry, the daily newspaper announced a new exclusivity policy by 
which advertisers must devote either all or none of their newspaper 
advertising to it ll1e newspaper refused advertising from several advertisers 
who did not follow its policy, which has led all of its big advertisers to drop 
their advertising in the weekly. As a result, the weekly is suffering large 
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losses and has announced its intention to cease publication unless the 
situation improves si3nificantly within the next three months. 
Analysis: Advertisers are customers of newspapers, not distributors. 
However, exclusives with ultimate customers can have anticompetitive effects. 
In this example, the all-or-nothing exclusive contract can deter the entry of the 
weekly newspaper. 1l1e weekly can not totally replace the daily for most 
advertisers, but only supplement it. By forcing advertisers to choose in this 
way, the exclusives will reduce the customer base for the weekly, possibly 
driving it below minimum viable scale. Even if there are enough advertisers 
who could switch their entire advertising budget to the weekly, they may be 
afraid to try, because if the weekly fails despite their business, the daily 
newspaper may subsequently retaliate against these advertisers by charging 
them higher prices. Alternatively, the daily may exploit the fear that the 
entrant will fail, by inducing advertisers, to sign long-term exclusive 
agreements in exchange for small payments. 
B. Applicatio11 to the GVRs 
TI1e GVRs apply the analysis of customer foreclosure to "single branding" 
restraints in iJ106 and then in more detail in Section 2.1 (~~138-60). "Single 
branding" refers to a buyer concentrating his orders for a product with one 
supplier. 1l1is specialization can restrict the market available to other 
suppliers. In particular, where the buyers are distributors, the other 
manufacturers may lack adequate distribution as a result. Or, as stated in 
~107, this may lead lo "foreclosure of the market." As the GVRs point out, this 
theory also applies lo Lying, where the foreclosure involves the "tied" product 
market. (See also ~~215-24). It also is applied lo exclusive supply (at ~~202-
14). 
The GVRs discuss a number of relevant factors for evaluating such 
restraints. I will highlight some of them here. One key factor is the market 
position of the buyer. The larger the buyer taking the exclusive, the smaller 
the customer base remaining available to competing suppliers. This factor is 
stressed in ~125 and ~141. 1l1e GVRs explain why the market share of the 
buyer is relevant to evaluating customer foreclosure. Entry barriers at the 
buyer's level also are relevant in evaluating the degree of real foreclosure, as 
explained in ~144. 
The market position of the supplier also is discussed. I found this 
discussion in the GVRs somewhat confusing. Even if there are numerous 
other efficient suppliers available, there can still be competitive harm if one of 
the suppliers ties up a large number of buyers. In effect, the exclusives can 
raise barriers to entry to other suppliers. As a result, the supplier with the 
exclusives will gain market power and increase ils market share. Thus, the 
"initial" market position may be less relevant than the impact on the barriers 
facing competing suppliers. 
This seems to ·be an issue of the guidelines being unclear rather than 
logically flawed. if127 recognizes the effect of exclusives on barriers to entry 
in general. When the analysis is applied to the single branding issue in ~144, 
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the GVRs point out that barriers to entry on the buyers' .level is relevant to 
evaluating whether the exclusives can cause barriers to entry and competitive 
problems at the suppliers' level. As ~144 states, if it is "relatively easy for 
competing suppliers lo create new buyers," then foreclosure is "unlikely to be 
a real problem." 
The GVRs also discuss the issue of cumulative effects with respect to single 
branding. As discussed in ~149, concerns are expanded when multiple 
suppliers tie up a limited number of available buyers. (See also ~206). 
Multiple exclusives do increase the barriers lo entry facing competing 
suppliers. However, as mentioned earlier, the ultimate consumers may be 
protected by the continued competition among the suppliers and buyers that 
have the exclusives. l11e GVRs apparently are more skeptical of the strength 
of this competition. 
In some cases, a combination of input and customer foreclosure can permit 
a vertically integrated firm to entrench market power by raising barriers to 
entry. This occurs when the exclusives, in effect, force new entrants to enter 
both the input and output markets simultaneously. This is sometimes 
referred to as the "two-level entry" problem. By raising the sunk capital costs 
of entry, requiring the entrant to have expertise in both markets and creating 
coordination costs, two-tier entry is more likely to be deterred than would be 
entry into a single market. l11e GVRs mention this issue in ~127. Then, in 
~171 they point out that the combination of exclusive distribution (input 
foreclosure) with single branding (customer foreclosure) increases the 
likelihood of harm. (See also ~207, with respect to exclusive supply). 
C. Co111petitio11 for Exclusives 
l11is analysis of exclusives in both input and customer foreclosure raises 
the question of why the entrants cannot simply compete in the "market" for 
exclusives. To the extent that the exclusives create procompetitive efficiency 
benefits, competition might well be maximized when each of the firms has 
some exclusives. For example, this is the case with television programs. A 
particular program is broadcast exclusively on one network, and each network 
has its own exclusive programs. A similar type of structure was described in 
the Videoworld and the (first) Cadko example. 
The GVRs are sensitive to the role of competition for exclusives in 
preventing anticompetitive harm. As slated in ~108 with respect to single 
branding (customer foreclosure), the "reduction in inter-brand competition 
may be mitigated by strong initial competition to obtain the single branding 
contracts." Confidence in the constraining power of competition for exclusives 
has led a number of U.S. courts to take a very permissive approach to 
exclusives with a short contractual duration. 24 
24. See, e.g., Omega Envtl. Inc. v. Gilbarco Inc. 123 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1997); Paddock 
Publications, Inc. v Chicago Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42 (7th Cir. 1996); U.S. Healthcare Inc. v. 
Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1993). 
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In my view, however, the constraints created by competition for exclusives 
should not be overestimated when there is a dominant firm or the market is 
highly concentrated. This process differs from competition in the sale of 
goods and services in a number of significant ways that can limit its benefits 
to consumers. To begin with, when a firm pays a supplier, distributor or 
customer to deal exclusively with it, it is not simply paying to obtain an 
additional supply source, or channel of distribution, or customer for itself. It 
also is paying for the right to exclude rivals from that supply source or 
channel of distribution or customer. In fact, that exclusion may be the sole or 
primary function of the exclusivity. This is not to say that exclusives are 
always anticompetitive. Exclusives can eliminate free riding, improve 
coordination or create other efficiency benefits. Efficiency benefits, however, 
are not inherent in exclusives. Exclusives instead might reduce competition 
by destroying rivals' efficient access to key inputs, make experimentation 
more difficult and raise switching costs. Stated most simply, the firm may be 
purchasing market power as well as a channel of distribution or source of 
supply or additional customer. 
There are a number of other reasons lo be skeptical of the consumer 
protection provided by competition for exclusives. First, in some situations 
there may not be real competition for the exclusives. An incumbent firm may 
obtain long term exclusives before there is another competitor on the horizon. 
By the lime the entrant is poised to enter, the input suppliers may be tied up 
in long-term exclusive contracts. This situation was suggested in the Cadko 
example. For the reasons discussed later on, one cannot count on the 
suppliers to make decisions that adequately protect the interests of consumers 
in these circumstances. 
Second, even where competition for exclusives does occur, it may not take 
place on a level playing field. The exclusive lends to be worth more to a 
dominant incumbent than undoing the exclusive is worth to an equally 
efficient entrant. This is because the entrant can earn only the (more 
competitive) duopoly return, whereas a dominant incumbent may earn the 
monopoly return if entry is deterred or significantly constrained. For example, 
suppose that the incumbent could earn $200 if it gets the exclusive and so 
retains its monopoly. If the entrant gets distribution and breaks the monopoly, 
suppose that the entrant and incumbent each would earn $70, for a total of 
$140. Because competition transfers weallh from producers to consumers, the 
total profits fall from competition (e.g., from $200 to $140). In this case, the 
entrant would be willing to bid up to $70 to obtain distribution, an amount 
equal to its profits from entry. In contrast, the incumbent would be willing to 
bid up to $130 for an exclusive that prevents the entry, an amount equal to the 
reduction in its profits from competition. The incumbent thus would win the 
bidding. This result obtains for as long as the aggregate market profits fall 
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from competilion.25 ll1is example also shows why competition for exclusives 
can not be assumed to reach the efficient outcome. 
1his is not a "deep pocket" argument ll1e incumbent's bidding advantage 
comes from the fact that it has already sunk the costs of entry together with 
the fact that monopoly profits exceed the profits in the more duopoly or 
competitive post entry market profits. Entry barriers are raised because the 
entrant's need to outbid the incumbent artificially raises its fixed costs of 
entry. ll1e bidding disadvantage faced by the entrant is "artificial" in the 
sense that the exclusivity does not have real and direct efficiency benefits in 
the example, but instead has the sole effect of raising barriers to entry. 
Third, exclusives increase switching costs and eliminate the ability of 
suppliers or consumers to experiment by devoting only a portion of their 
business to the entrant. This in turn raises their risk of switching. For the 
entrant, this decreases the likelihood that entry will succeed. This increased 
difficulty of coordination and the resulting barriers to entry and expansion are 
reinforced if the exclusive contracts are long-term and have "staggered" 
expiration dates. 26 ll1ese factors extend the period before the entrant can 
achieve viability. ll1ey also reinforce the consumers' or suppliers' expectations 
that the entry will not succeed, which may in turn make them less willing to 
take the risk of foregoing the exclusive in order to remain available to the 
entrant. As a result, they may require larger inducements to switch to the 
entrants, thus raising entry costs still further. 
This analysis of experimentation and switching costs suggests another 
reason why the entrant may face a bidding disadvantage. The retailers may 
not find the entrant's product adequate as its only offering, whereas the 
incumbcnt's product may be sufficient. In this situation, the entrant does not 
desire (or could it practically obtain) an exclusive. Instead, it wants only to 
maintain non-exclusivity. As discussed in the Trialsoft example, the 
distributor might be able to substitute a number of independent brands for 
the incumbent. But, in a bidding situation, these independent firms would 
face coordina lion problems in bidding against the dominant incumbent. 
Fourth, even if exclusives are terminable at will or embedded in short-term 
contracts, they still may erect a difficult coordination problem for an entrant. 
This increases the risk that the entrant will be unable to get enough 
distributors or enough customers to rapidly achieve minimum viable scale 
and maintain adequate investment incentives. Bidding still does not take 
place on a level playing field. ll1e exclusives also can lead retailers to expect 
the entry to fail, raising the fees the entrant must offer. This is because it is 
25. S. Salop, Strategic Entry Deterrence, 69 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers and Proceedings) 
335 (1979). 
26. By "staggered" expiration dates, I mean that the contracts do not all expire at the 
same time. This increases the coordination problem and entry costs facing the new entrant. 
If all the contracts expired at the same tin1e, the entrant might be able to coordinate its entry 
with the start-up dates of its own contracts. Of course, getting enough users to switch at the 
same time is itself a difficult coordination problem. Thus, staggering is not necessary for 
there to be a competitive problem. 
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difficult to convince enough suppliers or consumers to switch at the same 
time. 
TI.us is not to say that competition for exclusives has no con~training effects 
at all. It can. This is because the need to purchase exclusives also is costly to 
the incumbent firm. This cost of buying exclusives can act as somewhat of a 
deterrent. The constraint, however, is limited and does not eliminate 
competitive concerns. Nor can the existence of this competition or exclusives 
restricted to short durations legitimately provide the basis for an exemption 
from antitrust scrutiny. The more important question is whether the 
exclusives create real procompetitive efficiency benefits and whether those 
benefits will be passed on to consumers in a competitive output market. This 
is most likely when exclusives are divided up among the competing firms in 
the output market. 
This last point raises the question of why retailers or consumers ever 
would cooperate by agreeing to an exclusive that might allow a firm to 
achieve market power. This result, however, can occur because an individual 
distributor or consumer ignores the effect of its decision on others. As a result, 
the dominant firm can compensate the retailer or consumer for its own harm 
and still earn money from the incremental power gained with respect to 
others. In addition, if a retailer or consumer believes that the entrant likely 
will fail because others are granting exclusives, then it would not require 
significant compensation to grant exclusivity as well. Both these reasons flow 
from the same point: competition is a p11blic good. 
VI. THE MARKET SHARE THRESHOLD UNDER THE BER 
The GVRs provide a block exemption when the market share of the 
supplier does not exceed 30%, as discussed in ~89. For exclusive supply 
agreements, the block exemption will apply when the buyer's market share 
does not exceed 30%, as discussed in ~21 and ~92. Such exemptions (or 
"safety zones") are common in governmental guidelines.27 I will not comment 
directly on the determination of the market share levels chosen. Various 
guidelines in the United States also have set safe harbors at the 20-30% level. 
I want to focus instead on the determination of the relevant market from 
which these market shares are calculated. It should be clear from the analysis 
set out in tlus short article that the determination of the relevant market is not 
a trivial exercise. Vertical restraints involve the analysis of a number of 
markets - the market for the input, the market for the output and the market 
for related outputs. Distributors might be viewed as providing an input to 
manufacturers or as the customers of manufacturers. Shares in more than one 
market are relevant to the outcome. Thus, if market shares are to be used as 
27. In the United States there are safety zones in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, in 
the FTC's Health Care Statements 7 & 8, in the DO J's Intellectual Property Guidelines and 
in the Competitor Collaboration Guidelines. 
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proxies, they would be more useful if they were gauged in b9th the upstream 
and downstream markets relevant to a full competitive analysis. 
In addition, the proper relevant market depends on the type of 
anticompetitive allegation being considered. 1l1e market relevant to a claim 
that a vertical restraint will cause prices to rise above the current (pre-
restraint) level may be different from the one relevant to a claim that a vertical 
restraint will prevent prices from falling below the current level. This was 
explained in detail in the discussion of lhe Celloplinne Trap. In particular, a 
detem1ination that a firm has a low market share in a broad market might be 
relevant to restraints that could permit prices to rise in the future. But, it 
would not be relevant lo restraints that would raise entry barriers and prevent 
post-entry prices from falling. 
As a result, the use of antitrust exemptions and safety zones is prone to 
error. TI1is is less of a concern if the exemption is applied at the conclusion of 
the evaluation, once all the relevant theoretical and factual analysis has been 
carried out. At lhal point, however, a safely zone is no longer needed. The 
conclusion can be based on all the information, not just the market share level. 
When exemptions are used as a short cut lo truncate the evaluation at a 
preliminary stage, however, then there is a serious concern that the market 
shares will be based on the wrong relevant market. By limiting the evaluation 
solely to market share and ignoring entry barriers and other highly probative 
evidence, the accuracy of the prediction is further reduced. 28 
Exem plions and safety zones are favored because they are said to increase 
business' legal certainty, as the GVR's note in ~22. This can be true, but only 
if the market definition methodology is not sensitive to the concerns raised in 
this article. If lhe enforcement agencies, however, properly tailor the market 
definition methodology lo lhe particulars of the allegations, then the business 
certainly is lost unless the advisors are able to accurately predict the agencies' 
concerns. If business certainty is achieved only by limiting the evaluation to 
a single market determination that may or may not be the more probative 
market definition, then the business certainty will come at the expense of 
accuracy. 
For these reasons, I am somewhat skeptical of the value of these 
exemptions and safe harbors. In the situations in which it is obvious that no 
competitive concerns are raised, a formal exemption is not needed because the 
outcome is obvious. In the more difficult situations, the exemption can and 
will lead to significant policy errors. Nor will much certainty be achieved. 
Businesses need lo hire lawyers and economists to determine the proper 
relevant market. TI1e market definition methodology is complex and fact 
based, so that it often is difficull lo predict with a high degree of certainty 
what the enforcement agency will determine as the relevant market. This 
28. The Conm1ission appears aware of these issues but is concerned about making a 
"radical d1cmge" and providing a "lower level" of legal certainty. Communication from the 
Commission on the application of the Conmmnity competition rules to vertical restraints 
(Follow up to the Green Paper on Vertical Restraints) (Undated), http://europa.eu.int 
/comm/competition/ antitrust/ others/. 
200 FORDHAM CORPORA TE LAW INSTITUTE 
point is illustrated by the complexity of the market definition analysis in the 
Videoworld example. 
To the extent, however, that there is a commitment to using market share 
thresholds to define a safe harbor, accuracy can be improved in the following 
way. First, the markets should be defined in the context of the particular 
anticompetitive concerns raised about the vertical restraints. In particular, the 
relevant markets definitions might vary according to whether the relevant 
competitive concern involves exclusion or collusion, and whether it involves 
achievement of market power or maintenance of pre-existing market power. 
Second, market shares should be gauged in both the upstream and 
downstream markets. For example, the safe harbor might only apply if the 
market shares of the group of restrained and restraining firms both are less 
than 30%. Of course, accuracy would be further increased if the analysis 
would include evaluation of entry barriers. 
